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CASE COMMENT
O'CONNOR V. DONALDSON: THE DEATH OF THE
QUID PRO QUO ARGUMENT FOR A
RIGHT TO TREATMENT?
O N JUNE 26, 1975, the Supreme Court was confronted with the con-
troversial issue of whether there is a constitutionally guaranteed
right to treatment for nondangerous persons who have been involun-
tarily and civilly committed to mental institutions.' The Court avoided
this long advocated issue2 and created the potential for future litigation'
I O'Connor v. Donaldson, - U.S. _, 95 S. Ct. 2486 (1975).
2 The constitutional right to treatment for the mentally ill has been recognized by both
federal and state courts. See Wyatt v. Stickney, 325 F. Supp. 781 (M.D. Ala. 1971),
standards established, 334 F. Supp. 1341 (M.D. Ala. 1971), standards enforced, 344
F. Supp. 373 (M.D. Ala. 1972), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, remanded in part, sub nom.,
Wyatt v. Aderholt, 503 F.2d 1305 (5th Cir. 1974); Burnham v. Department of Pub.
Health, 503 F.2d 1319 (5th Cir. 1974), rev'g (on principles espoused in Wyatt v.
Aderholt), 349 F. Supp. 1335 (N.D. Ga. 1972); Rouse v. Cameron, 373 F.2d 451, 453
(D.C. Cir. 1966); Welsch v. Likins, 373 F. Supp. 487, 496 (D. Minn. 1974); Kessel-
brenner v. Anonymous, 33 N.Y.2d 161, 305 N.E.2d 903, 350 N.Y.S.2d 889 (1973);
Renelli v. Department of Mental Hygiene, 340 N.Y.S.2d 498 (Sup. Ct. 1973). See
also Brief for Respondent at 35-37, nn.26-28, O'Connor v. Donaldson, __ U.S. -,
95 S. Ct. 2486 (1975). There is also a widening body of precedent holding that there
is a constitutional right to treatment for persons incarcerated under "non-penal"
statutes for the purpose of care and treatment. See Morales v. Turman, 364 F. Supp.
166, 175 (E.D. Tex. 1973) (the failure to provide treatment for juvenile delinquents
confined in anti-rehabilitative environments constitutes a violation of due process);
Stachulak v. Coughlin, 364 F. Supp. 686 (N.D. Ill. 1973); Davy v. Sullivan, 354 F. Supp.
1320, 1328-29 (M.D. Ala. 1973) (involving sexual offenders and defective delinquents);
United States v. Pardue, 354 F. Supp. 1377, 1382 (D. Conn. 1973); Nelson v. Heyne,
355 F. Supp. 451 (N.D. Ind. 1972), af!'d, 491 F.2d 352 (7th Cir. 1974), cert. denied,
417 U.S. 976 (1974); Martarella v. Kelley, 349 F. Supp. 575, 585, 598-600 (S.D.N.Y.
1972), standards established, 359 F. Supp. 478 (S.D.N.Y. 1973); Inmates of the Boys'
Training School v. Affleck, 346 F. Supp. 1354, 1364 (D.R.I. 1972); United States v.
Walker, 335 F. Supp. 705, 708 (N.D. Cal. 1971); Nason v. Superintendent of Bridge-
water State Hospital, 353 Mass. 604, 612-13, 233 N.E.2d 908, 913-14 (1968) (involving
persons incompetent to stand trial); M. v. M., 336 N.Y.S.2d 304 (Fam. Ct. 1972)
(involving persons in need of supervision). But see New York State Ass'n for Retarded
Children, Inc. v. Rockefeller, 357 F. Supp. 752, 762 (E.D.N.Y. 1973); Burnham v.
Department of Pub. Health, 349 F. Supp. 1335 (N.D. Ga. 1972), rev'd, 503 F.2d 1319
(5th Cir. 1974) (rejecting a constitutional right to treatment).
Though the constitutional right to treatment for involuntarily committed mental
patients is of very recent origin, being first articulated in Birnbaum, The Right to
Treatment, 46 A.B.A.J. 499 (1960), it has "received an unusual amount of scholarly
discussion and support." Donaldson v. O'Connor, 493 F.2d 507, 519 (5th Cir. 1974),
vacated and remanded, - U.S. -, 95 S. Ct. 2486 (1975). There have been over forty
law review articles written on the subject, most of which support a constitutional right
to treatment. See, e.g., Bazelon, Implementing the Right to Treatment, 36 U. CHu. L.
REV. 742 (1969); Birnbaum, A Rationale for the Right, 57 GEo. L.J. 752 (1969);
Birnbaum, The Right to Treatment-Some Comments on Implementation, 10 DuQUESNE
L. REV. 579 (1972); Birnbaum, Some Remarks on "The Right to Treatment", 23 ALA.
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by holding that a state cannot constitutionally confine a nondangerous
individual solely for custodial care if such person can live safely in the
outside world, without a finding of more than mere mental illness.4
This comment will discuss the decision in terms of the most volatile and
frequently urged constitutional argument - a right to treatment based on
a quid pro quo5 concept.
I. THE QUID PRo Quo THEORY
The quid pro quo due process theory for a constitutional right to treat-
ment has two distinct rationales. The first is a procedural due process
rationale which developed from the premise that since civil commit-
ment proceedings lack the same procedural safeguards accorded criminal
proceedings, the absence of such guarantees is constitutionally justified
only when the purpose of commitment is treatment that will either cure
or improve the mental health of the patient.6 Here, the quid for the
L. REV. 623 (1971); Chambers, Alternatives to Civil Commitment of the Mentally Ill:
Practical Guides and Constitutional imperatives, 70 MICH. L. REV. 1108 (1972);
Drake, Enforcing the Right to Treatment: Wyatt v. Stickney, 10 AM. ClM. L. REV. 587
(1972); Goodman, Right to Treatment: The Responsibility of the Courts, 57 GEO. L.J.
680 (1969); Katz, The Right to Treatment - An Enchanting Legal Fiction?, 36 U. CHI.
L. REV. 755 (1969); Murdock, Civil Rights of the Mentally Retarded: Some Critical
Issues, 48 NoTRE DAME LAW. 133 (1972); Robitscher, The Right to Psychiatric Treat-
ment: A Social-Legal Approach to the Plight of the State Hospital Patient, 18 VILL. L.
REV. 11 (1972).
The present standards among the majority of states for involuntary commitment do
not require a showing of dangerousness to either oneself or others. See Note,
Developments in the Law: Civil Commitment of the Mentally Ill, 87 HARV. L. REV.
1190, 1202-07 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Developments in the Law]. Most states
have not clearly or precisely identified the type and degree of mental disorder which
makes compulsory hospitalization appropriate. See also AMERICAN BAR FOUNDATION,
THE MENTALLY DISABLED AND THE LAW 39 (S. Brakel & R. Rock eds. rev. 1971).
For example, a recently adopted New Hampshire law defines mental illness as "mal-
adaptive behavior and/or recognized emotional symptoms that can be related to
psychological, physiological and/or sociologic factors." N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §
135-B:2 (Supp. 1973). Conceivably, the Court's decision may arouse thousands of
nondangerous involuntarily civilly committed mental patients to challenge the statutes
under which they have been committed, seeking release via habeas corpus petitions,
and possibly damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970), infra note 32. Procedurally,
class actions based on § 1983, are more desirable than individual habeas corpus pro-
ceedings where relief is granted to the individual petitioner. See Drake, Enforcing
the Right to Treatment: Wyatt v. Stickney, 10 AM. CrM. L. REV. 587, 595 (1972);
46 Miss. L.J. 345, 350 n.36 (1975); cf. Knecht v. Gillman, 488 F.2d 1136, 1140 (8th
Cir. 1973) (although § 1983 does not specify judicial relief, it does not exclude such
relief). But see Williams v. Richardson, 481 F.2d 358, 361 (8th Cir. 1973) (habeas
corpus petition treated as a class action when challenging conditions of confinement).
See generally Comment, Civil Rights: The Federal Courts and the "Right to Treat-
ment" Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970), 27 OKLA. L. REV. 238 (1974). In 1972,
403,924 persons were admitted to state mental institutions, 41.8% of whom were
involuntarily civilly committed. Developments in the Law, supra, at 1193 n.3; 46 Miss.
L.J. 345, 346 n.13 (1975). See also N.Y. Times, June 27,,1975, § 1, at 1, col. 5.
4 _ U.S. _ 95 S. Ct. 2486 (1975).
5 "What for what; something for something. Used in the law for the giving of one
valuable thing for another." BLACK's LAW DICTnONAnY 415 (4th rev. ed. 1968).
6 Donaldson v. O'Connor, 493 F.2d 507, 522 (5th Cir. 1974), vacated and remanded,
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lack of guaranteed procedural safeguards available to persons incarcer-
ated via the criminal process (the quo), is treatment.
Judge Wisdom, writing for the court of appeals in Donaldson v.
O'Connor,7 distinguished this "procedural quid pro quo" theory from a
"substantive quid pro quo" rationale.' The "substantive quid pro quo,"
espoused by Judge Wisdom, states that when the central limitations on
the government's power to detain are inapplicable, 9 as in the case of a
nondangerous involuntarily committed patient, there must be a quid pro
quo extended by the government in the form of treatment. 0 When the
state seeks to exercise its parens patriae authority" it must fulfill its
parental role by providing treatment. Thus, effective treatment must be
the quid for the state's right to exercise its parens patriae controls (the
quo). 2 The key distinction seems to be that the substantive quid pro quo
theory looks at the reason for confinement, whereas the procedural theory
looks only at how the confinement came about.
Prior to Judge Wisdom's differentiation of the procedural and substan-
tive rationales, the quid pro quo language had been used as shorthand
- U.S. -, 95 S. Ct. 2486 (1975); Ragsdale v. Overholser, 281 F.2d 943, 949 (D.C.
Cir. 1960) (Fahy, J., concurring); Welsch v. Likins, 373 F. Supp. 487, 496 (D. Minn.
1974); Wyatt v. Stickney, 325 F. Supp. 781, 785 (M.D. Ala. 1971). See also Rouse v.
Cameron, 373 F.2d 451, 453 (D.C. Cir. 1966); New York State Ass'n for Retarded
Children, Inc. v. Rockefeller, 357 F. Supp. 752, 761 (E.D.N.Y. 1973); Inmates of the
Boys' Training School v. Affleck, 346 F. Supp. 1354 (D.RI. 1972); cf. McKeiver v.
Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528, 552 (1971) (White, J., concurring); Knecht v. Gillman,
488 F.2d 1136, 1138 (8th Cir. 1973).
7 493 F.2d 507 (5th Cir. 1974), vacated and remanded, - U.S. - 95 S. Ct. 2486
(1975).
s Id. at 522 nn. 21 & 22. The court cited Kittrie, Can the Right to Treatment Remedy the
Ills of the Juvenile System?, 57 GEO. L.J. 848, 870 (1969) for the proposition that
a new concept of substantive due process is evolving in [this] therapeutic
realm. This concept is founded upon a recognition of the concurrency between
the state's exercise of sanctioning powers [police powers] and its assumption of
the duties of social responsibility. Its implication is that effective treatment
must be the quid pro quo for society's right to exercise its parens patriae
controls.
9 The limitations referred to are: that detention be in retribution for a specific offense;
that it be limited to a fixed term; and that it be permitted after a proceeding where
fundamental procedural safeguards are observed. In civil commitment proceedings,
the limitations which seem inapplicable are: that confinement is not in retribution for
a specific offense, and that it is not limited to a fixed term because of the difficulty
of determining what effect the treatment will have on the individual. See note 59
infra.
10 493 F.2d at 522.
1 The parens patriae doctrine is founded upon an individual's need for care and treatment
and his inability to make a rational determination regarding his own hospitalization.
The parens patriae function has been viewed as a power which the members of the
community have granted the state for the protection of their future well-being. For
further discussion of this power and its use as the basis of laws providing for the in-
voluntary commitment of the mentally ill, see N. KIT'rBIE, THE Ri-rr TO BE DIFFERENT
(1971); Murdock, Civil Rights of the Mentally Retarded: Some Critical Issues, 48
NOTRE DAME LAW. 133, 155 (1972); Note, Developments in the Law, supra note 3,
at 1208; 46 Miss. L.J. 345 n.3 (1975).
12 Donaldson v. O'Connor, 493 F.2d 507, 522 n.22 (5th Cir. 1974), vacated and remanded,
- U.S. _ 95 S. Ct. 2486 (1975). See also Nelson v. Heyne, 491 F.2d 352, 360
(7th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 976 (1974).
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for the idea that due process requires that the governmental means of
abridging a person's protected liberties must, at least, bear a rational re-
lation to the purpose of the abridgement, and that the resulting commit-
ment, which abridges the individual's fundamental due process right to
be free from physical restraint, must be based on a legitimate compelling
state interest. This shorthand analysis tends to obscure the difference
between confinement of the dangerous versus the nondangerous men-
tally ill person and the voluntarily versus the involuntarily committed
individual. This in turn tends to blur the distinction between parens
patriae and the state's police powers.
II. THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE QUID PRO Quo THEORY
The quid pro quo argument for the right to treatment is of very
recent origin, being first articulated in 1960 by Dr. Morton Birnbaum.1
3
In this seminal article, Dr. Birnbaum, who is also an attorney, contended
that a state which purposely restrains an individual and deprives him of
his freedom because of a determination that he is mentally ill, owes that
person a duty to provide adequate medical treatment, otherwise the men-
tal hospital becomes a prison.' 4 Dr. Birnbaum's proposal went unrecog-
nized by the courts until Rouse v. Cameron.1 5 In Rouse, the petitioner,
who had been involuntarily and civilly committed to a mental institution
following acquittal of a misdemeanor by reason of insanity, filed a
habeas corpus petition alleging that he was not receiving treatment.'
6
Despite the fact that the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
recognized a statutory, rather than constitutional, right to treatment,
7
the opinion is most celebrated for its dictum in which Chief Judge Baze-
lon suggested the possibility of a constitutional right to treatment. He
stated that such a right might be derived from the due process clause,
the equal protection clause, or the cruel and unusual punishment clause
of the eighth amendment.'"
The quid pro quo argument for the constitutional right to treatment
was first used as an actual basis of decision in Wyatt v. Stickney.'9
13 Birnbaum, The Right to Treatment, 46 A.B.A.J. 499 (1960).
14 Id. at 503. See also Editorial, A New Right, 46 A.B.A.J. 516, 517 (1960).
15 373 F.2d 451 (D.C. Cir. 1966). Prior cases had held that the purpose of nonpenal
confinement was to provide treatment without specifically recognizing treatment as a
constitutional right. See, e.g., Sas v. Maryland, 334 F.2d 506, 513 (4th Cir. 1964),
petition for cert. dismissed, 407 U.S. 355 (1972); Ragsdale v, Overholser, 281 F.2d
943, 950 (D.C. Cir. 1960) (Fahy J., concurring). See also 46 Miss. L.J. 345, 347 n.18
(1975).
16 Charles Rouse was charged with carrying a concealed weapon, a misdemeanor with a
maximum prison sentence of one year. After four years in St. Elizabeth Hospital,
Rouse filed his petition on grounds that he was receiving no treatment and was no
longer insane.
17 D.C. CODE ANN. § 21-562 (1973) (a person hospitalized in a public hospital for a mental
illness shall be entitled to medical and psychiatric care and treatment).
's 373 F.2d at 453.
IS 325 F. Supp. 781 (M.D. Ala. 1971), standards established, 334 F. Supp. 1341 (M.D.
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Wyatt was a class action in which a group of patients and employees
at Bryce Hospital in Tuscaloosa, Alabama successfully challenged the
adequacy of care being provided. The Wyatt court stated:
To deprive any citizen of his or her liberty upon the altruistic
theory that the confinement is for humane therapeutic reasons
and then to fail to provide adequate treatment violates the very
fundamentals of due process.2
0
The court held that the only constitutional justification for civil commit-
ment is treatment, such that each patient would have a realistic oppor-
tunity to improve.2' Thus, the quid for the deprivation of a civilly
committed mental patient's liberty (the quo) is treatment. In the wake
of Wyatt, other courts have recognized a constitutionally guaranteed
right to treatment based on the quid pro quo rationale. 22
Although the Supreme Court has never squarely dealt with the issue of
a right to treatment, 23 and therefore has not ruled upon the validity of
the quid pro quo due process argument, the Court held in Jackson v.
Indiana,24 that when an individual is confined under commitment pro-
ceedings involving abridged procedural and substantive protections,
"[a]t the least, due process requires that the nature and duration of com-
mitment bear some reasonable relation to the purposes for which the
individual is committed." 25 Jackson involved a mentally defective deaf
mute who was committed after the court determined that he was incom-
petent to stand trial for two petty robberies. Since the mental and physi-
cal defects which were the cause of his inability were not likely to
improve during his confinement, the Supreme Court ruled that the state
Ala. 1971), standards enforced, 344 F. Supp. 373 (M.D. Ala. 1972), aff'd in part,
rev'd in part, remanded in part, sub nom., Wyatt v. Aderholt, 503 F.2d 1305 (5th Cir.
1974).
20 325 F. Supp. at 785. See also Brief of Amici Curiae on Appeal to the Fifth Circuit in
Wyatt v. Stickney (Aderholt), as reprinted in 1 LEGAL Ricwrs OF THE MENTALLY HANDI-
CAPPED 335, 393-400 (B. Ennis & P. Friedman eds. 1974).
21 325 F. Supp. at 785.
22 See, e.g., Stachulak v. Coughlin, 364 F. Supp. 686 (N.D. Il. 1973); Burchett v.
Bower, 355 F. Supp. 1278 (D. Ariz. 1973); Kesselbrenner v. Anonymous, 33 N.Y.2d
161, 305 N.E.2d 903, 350 N.Y.S.2d 889 (1973). Contra, New York State Ass'n for
Retarded Children, Inc. v. Rockefeller, 357 F. Supp. 752 (E.D.N.Y. 1973) (procedural
due process is not a foundation on which to base a constitutional right to treatment).
See also 2 FORDHAM URBAN L.J. 363 (1974); 46 Miss. L.J. 345, 351 n.42 (1975).
23 The closest the Supreme Court came to speaking on the quid pro quo rationale was
in In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967), in which the Court, in the context of juvenile con-
finement, wrote:
[I]t should be noted that to the extent that the special procedures for juveniles
are thought to be justified by the special consideration and treatment afforded
them, there is reason to doubt that juveniles always receive the benefits of such
a quid pro quo. Id. at 22 n.30.
There the Court seemed to be discussing the procedural aspect of the quid pro quo
theory.
24 406 U.S. 715 (1972).
2-5 Id. at 738.
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could only detain him for a reasonable period of time to determine if
improvement was possible so that he could stand trial in the forseeable
future. Otherwise, in order to confine him indefinitely, the state would
be required to proceed under civil commitment provisions.
The holding lends support to the quid pro quo rationale in that if
the purpose for confinement is treatment, then, absent treatment, the
nature of confinement bears no reasonable relation to the purpose of
such confinement and therefore violates the due process rule of Jack-
son. 6  In effect, there has been no treatment administered for the right
to exercise the state's parens patriae powers, or to justify the absence
and inapplicability of the criminal process procedural safeguards.2 7
III. THE DONALDSON CASE AND QUID Pno Quo
Kenneth Donaldson, a former mental patient S who was confined
on parens patriae grounds29 for fourteen and one-half years in Florida
State Hospital, brought an action for damages under the fourteenth
amendment and 42 U.S.C. § 198330 against Dr. J. B. O'Connor, the
hospital's superintendent, and other staff members,3' alleging that they
26 Brief for Respondent at 57, O'Connor v. Donaldson, __ U.S. _ 95 S. Ct. 2486 (1975).
See also Murel v. Baltimore City Criminal Ct., 407 U.S. 355, 357-58 (1972) (the
commitment of a "defective delinquent" should be reviewed in terms of the "criteria,
procedures and treatment provided"); McNeil v. Director, Patuxent Institution, 407 U.S.
245, 248-50 (1972) (applying this principle to an individual held for psychiatric ob-
servations after the expiration of a prison sentence); Humphrey v. Cady, 405 U.S.
504, 514 (1972) (indefinitely committed sex offender's allegation that he was receiving
no treatment was a "substantial constitutional claim").
27 Supra note 12.
28 Donaldson was committed January 3, 1957, on the petition of his father and after a
brief hearing before county Judge Jack F. White of Pinellas County, Florida. He was
admitted to the Florida State Hospital twelve days later where he was diagnosed as a
"paranoid schizophrenic." The committing judge told Donaldson that he would be sent
to Florida State Hospital for "a few weeks rest" after which he would be all right and
would come back soon. Donaldson was not released until July 31, 1971. For a more
thorough and frightening account of the facts, see B. ENNIS, PRISONERS OF PSYCHIATRY
83 (1972); Birnbaum, A Rational for the Right, 57 GEO. L.J. 752, 774 (1969). See
also Donaldson v. O'Connor, 493 F.2d 507, 513 (5th Cir. 1974).
25 Supra note 11.
30 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970) provides:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or
usage, of any State or Territory, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen
of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the depriva-
tion of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws,
shall be liable to the other party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or
other proper proceedings for redress.
11 Originally, Donaldson had filed a class action on behalf of himself and all other patients
in Florida State Hospital. Two weeks before the pretrial conference the hospital
director certified that Donaldson was no longer incompetent and released him. The
petition was then dismissed by the court because Donaldson was no longer a bona fide
representative of the patients still in the hospital. An amended complaint sought
compensatory and punitive damages on Donaldson's behalf and sought broad declara-
tory and injunctive relief, but the request for the latter relief was abandoned prior to
trial. 493 F.2d at 512-13.
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had intentionally and maliciously deprived him of his constitutional right
to either receive treatment or be released from the hospital. The evidence
showed that Donaldson, whose frequent requests for release had been re-
jected by Dr. O'Connor, was dangerous neither to himself nor to others,
and if mentally ill, had not received treatment. Dr. O'Connor contended
that he had acted in good faith, relying on the state law which authorized
indefinite custodial confinement of the "sick" even if they were not
treated and were not harmful to themselves or others. A jury found the
attending physicians liable 2 and the district court held that it was un-
constitutional to prolong confinement without treatment of a patient who
was neither dangerous to himself nor to anyone else.33 Defendants on
appeal, challenged the sufficiency of the evidence to support the jury ver-
dict and denied the existence of any constitutionally guaranteed right to
treatment for mental patients involuntarily committed. The Court of Ap-
peals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court's judgment and held
that a nondangerous person, involuntarily committed under civil commit-
ment procedures to a state mental hospital, has a due process right to
receive such individual treatment as will accord a reasonable opportu-
nity to be cured or to improve his mental condition.34  The Supreme
Court granted Dr. O'Connor's petition for certiorari because of the im-
portant constitutional questions presented.35
A. The Supreme Court - The Majority Opinion
Justice Potter Stewart, in writing the narrow opinion for the unani-
mous Court, avoided the broad issues dealt with by the court of appeals
and viewed the case as raising a "single, relatively simple, but nonethe-
less important question concerning every man's constitutional right to
liberty."36  The Court refused to decide two related constitutional ques-
32 Judgment was rendered on the jury's verdict of $28,500 in compensatory damages,
and $10,000 in punitive damages against defendants-appellants, Dr. J.B. O'Connor,
Donaldson's attending physician from 1957 until mid-1959, Clinical Director of the
hospital from mid-1959 until 1963, and Superintendent thereafter until his retirement
in 1971, and Dr. John Gumanis, Donaldson's attending physician from the fall of 1959
until the spring of 1967. 493 F.2d at 512-13.
33 Excerpts from trial judge's charge to the jury, as summarized in 1 LEGAL RIGHTS OF
THE MENTALLY HANDICAPPED, 611, 618 (B. Ennis & P. Friedman eds. 1974).
34 493 F.2d at 520.
35 419 U.S. 894 (1974).
31 - U.S. at - 95 S. Ct. at 2492. The Court stated:
We have concluded that the difficult issues of constitutional law dealt with by
the Court of Appeals are not presented by this case in its present posture.
Specifically, there is no reason now to decide whether mentally ill persons
dangerous to themselves or to others have a right to treatment upon com-
pulsory confinement by the State, or whether the State may compulsorily con-
fine a nondangerous mentally ill individual for the purpose of treatment . . ..
We need not decide whether, when, or by what procedures, a mentally ill person
may be confined by the State on any of the grounds which, under contemporary
statutes, ard generally to justify involuntary confinement of such a person -
to prevent injury to the public, to ensure his own survival or safety, or to alleviate
1975]
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tions adjudicated by the court of appeals: whether the dangerous mental-
ly ill person has a constitutional right to treatment when involuntarily
committed and whether the state may involuntarily confine a nondanger-
ous mentally ill person in order to give him treatment.37  The majority
opinion, therefore, did not confront the quid pro quo argument for the
right to treatment. The Court unanimously vacated and remanded the
case, holding that a state cannot constitutionally confine, merely for
custodial care, a nondangerous patient without more than a finding of
mental illness if the patient is capable of safely surviving in society by
himself or with the help of family or friends.
38
The Court reasoned that given the findings of the jury, 39 there was
no justification for Donaldson's continued confinement. Although the
question of whether Donaldson's initial confinement was constitutionally
permissible -was not in issue, the Court observed that even if it were per-
missible, the state could not constitutionally continue confinement after
the basis for the original commitment no longer existed. 4°  The Court
further stated:
A finding of "mental illness" alone cannot justify a State's lock-
ing a person up against his will and keeping him indefinitely
in simple custodial confinement. . . . [T]here is still no consti-
tutional basis for confining such persons involuntarily if they
are dangerous to no one and can live safely in freedom. 41
The Court sidestepped the quid pro quo argument for a constitutional
right to treatment and held instead that mere custodial care is not a
or cure his illness .... For the jury found that none of the above grounds for
confinement was present in Donaldson's case. Id. at -, 95 S. Ct. at 2492-93
(footnotes omitted).
37 Id.
38 Id. Might the "help" not come from social and welfare agencies since some confined
individuals may not have any living family members or friends outside the hospital,
or none which would be willing to help? See N.Y. Times, Aug. 17, 1975 at 1, col. 5.
An issue raised by the petitioner and dealt with by the Court, involved the scope of the
qualified immunity possessed by state officials under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Citing Wood
v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308 (1975), the Court held the relevant question for the jury to
be whether O'Connor
knew or reasonably should have known that the action he took within his sphere
of official responsibility would violate the constitutional rights of [Donaldson]
or if he took the action with the malicious intention to cause a deprivation of
constitutional rights or other injury to [Donaldson]. - U.S. at -, 95 S. Ct.
at 2494.
The only issue to be determined on remand was whether O'Connor was to be held
liable for monetary damages for violating Donaldson's constitutional right to liberty.
Id. at n.12. See also Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 247-48 (1974).
39 The jury found that Donaldson was neither dangerous to himself nor dangerous to
others, and that if Donaldson was mentally ill, he had not received treatment. The jury
was also aware that while confined, Donaldson had written and published a law review
article describing the conditions under which he was committed and, the lack of any
treatment. Patient No. A-25738, The Right to Treatment Inside Out, 57 GEO. L.J. 886
(1969).
40 To support this statement the Court cited Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715, 738 (1972).
See also text accompanying notes 23-27 supra.
41 - U.S. at -, 95 S. Ct. at 2493.
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permissible purpose for involuntary confinement of the mentally ill.
Although the Court did not decide by what procedures or upon what
grounds a state may constitutionally confine a mentally ill person,
42
the opinion held that the existence of state law authorizing such commit-
ment, of itself, does not establish an adequate constitutional purpose.43
Furthermore, a determination of "mental illness" without a finding of
dangerousness or the inability to live safely in society, and without the
provision of treatment, cannot justify involuntary confinement. 4 4  Thus,
the Supreme Court concluded that the "in need of care or assistance"
standard, promulgated by the parens patriae rationale of most state legis-
latures,4 5 has no valid constitutional basis if a person is nondangerous
42 Id. at -, 95 S. Ct. at 2492. The Court pointed out that the grounds generally ad-
vanced by most state legislatures to justify involuntary commitment are: danger to
others, danger to oneself or in need of care, treatment, or supervision. These grounds
have been analytically conceived as falling into the categories of the police power
rationale for commitment or the parens patriae rationale; danger to others is a function
of the police power rationale, in need of care or treatment is a function of the parens
patriae rationale, danger to oneself combines elements of both. Donaldson v. O'Connor,
493 F. 2d 507, 522 (5th Cir. 1974), vacated and remanded, - U.S. - 95 S. Ct. 2486
(1975). See Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715, 737 (1972); Developments in the Law,
supra note 3, at 1203; Note, Civil Commitment of the Mentally Ill: Theories and Pro-
cedures, 79 HAnv. L. REV. 1288, 1289-97 (1966); Note, The Nascent Right to Treat-
ment, 53 VA. L. REV. 1134, 1138-39 (1967); see also Brief for Respondent at 48,
O'Connor v. Donaldson, __ U.S. - 95 S. Ct. 2486 (1975).
13 - U.S. at - 95 S. Ct. at 2493.
44 Id. The issue of the state's exercise of its police power in a given circumstance has
been a matter of much scholarly discussion particularly surrounding the determination
of dangerousness. See, e.g., Developments in the Law, supra note 3, at 1236-53; Note,
The Nascent Right to Treatment, 53 VA. L. REV. 1134, 1141-43 (1967). See generally
B. ENNIS, PRISONERS OF PSYCIATRY (1972); T. SZASZ, LAW, LIBERTY AND PsYCHIATRY:
AN INQUIRY INTO THE SOCIAL USES OF MENTAL HEALTH PRACTICES (1963); Ennis &
Litwack, Psychiatry and the Presumption of Expertise: Flipping Coins in the Court
Room, 62 CALIF. L. REV. 693 (1974).
45 At the present time, fourteen states have provisions for involuntary commitment of an
individual if he is dangerous or in need of treatment; fifteen others permit compulsory
hospitalization based on a mental illness which renders the individual in need of care
and treatment or a fit subject for hospitalization. Seven others require that commit-
ment be necessary to protect the welfare of the individual or others. See Develop-
ments in the Law, supra note 3, at 1203-04 nn. 12-14. The commitment statute in Ohio
defines a mentally ill person as
an individual having an illness which substantially impairs the capacity of the
person to use self-control, judgment, and discretion in the conduct of his affairs
and social relations. . . . OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 5122.01 (A) (Page 1972).
The Ohio legislature is currently considering a bill which, if passed, would change this
definition and provide that:
(B) Mentally ill person subject to hospitalization by court order means a
mentally ill person who, because of his illness:
(1) Represents a substantial risk of physical harm to himself . . .
(2) Represents a substantial risk of physical harm to others . . .
(3) Represents a substantial and immediate risk of physical impairment
or injury to himself as manifested by evidence that he is unable to provide for
and is not providing for his basic physical needs . . . ;
(4) Could benefit from treatment in a hospital . . . and is in need of
such treatment as manifested by evidence of behavior that creates a grave and
imminent risk to substantial right of others or himself. H.B. 244, 111th General
Assembly, Reg. Sess. § 5122.01 (B) (1975-76).
See also, AMERICAN BAR FOUNDATION, THE MENTALLY DISABLED AND THE LAW 66-71
(rev. ed. S. Brakel & R. Rock eds. 1971).
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and able to survive outside the hospital's walls.46 Although Justice Stew-
art, writing for the majority, conceded that a state has a legitimate in-
terest in providing care and assistance for the mentally ill,47 he further
stated:
[I]ncarceration is rarely if ever a necessary condition for rais-
ing the living standards of those capable of surviving safely in
freedom, on their own or with the help of family or friends.4"
Whereas the full impact of the Court's present holding is yet to be
felt,49 the parens patriae "need for care" standard for commitment can
no longer be a justification for confinement of those nondangerous indi-
viduals who are capable of surviving alone or with help. It thereby makes
the quid pro quo argument for the right to treatment inapplicable to
such individuals because the state can no longer exchange the "comforts"
of an institution for the power to exercise its parens patriae controls for
the purpose of simple custodial confinement.
B. Chief Justice Burger - Concurring
In his concurring opinion, Chief Justice Burger appraised the quid
pro quo theory described and adopted by Judge Wisdom in Donaldson
v. O'Connor:50
[A] due process right to treatment is based on the principle that
when the three central limitations on the government's power to
detain . . . are absent, there must be a quid pro quo extended
. . . to justify confinement. And the quid pro quo most com-
monly recognized is the provision of rehabilitative treatment.
5
'
The Chief Justice then pointed out what he considered to be defects in-
herent in this rationale. First, it would seem to permit a state to con-
fine an individual, regardless of such person's ability to survive safely in
society, 52 thus raising the "gravest of constitutional problems. '"' Sec-
46 _ U.S. at __ 95 S. Ct. at 2493.
47 Id. This is a restatement of the state's parens patriae power. For a discussion of the
parens patriae power, see note 11 supra. But see Note, Parens Patriae and Statutory
Vagueness in the Juvenile Court, 82 YALE L.J. 745, 748 (1973).
4- U.S. at -, 95 S. Ct. at 2494. The Court cited Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479
(1960) for the proposition that:
[E]ven though the governmental purpose be legitimate and substantial, that
purpose cannot be pursued by means that broadly stifle fundamental personal
liberties when the end can be more narrowly achieved .. .where legislative
abridgement of "fundamental personal rights and liberties" is asserted, "the
courts should be astute to examine the effect of the challenged legislation."
364 U.S. at 488-89, citing in part, Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147, 161 (1939).
49 See text accompanying notes 77-81 infra.
50 493 F.2d 507, 522 (5th Cir. 1974).
51 493 F.2d at 522.
12 _ U.S. at _, 95 S. Ct. at 2499.
5 The Chief Justice did not explicitly state what constitutional problems were raised,
but a reading of his opinion concomitantly with the majority opinion indicates his
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ondly, the quid pro quo theory incorrectly presupposes that essentially
the same interests are involved in every situation where a state seeks to
confine an individual. 54  Finally, the theory accepts the absence of pro-
cedural safeguards and insists that the state provide benefits (treatment)
as compensation or as justification for confinement, thus equating an in-
voluntary mental patient's constitutional right not to be confined without
due process of law with a constitutional right to treatment. 5  In con-
cluding, the Chief Justice stated: "[o]ur concepts of due process would
not tolerate such a 'trade-off'. '" 56
Justice Burger noted that the quid pro quo rationale is vulnerable to
other criticisms. 57  The rationale seems to imply that if procedural safe-
guards, commensurate with those accorded in criminal proceedings, are
provided in civil commitment proceedings, there would be no due pro-
cess basis for a constitutional right to treatment. Similarly, individuals
committed under the police power rationale would not be guaranteed a
right to treatment.5  Moreover, a state could assert that since treat-
ment is in fact being provided 59 adequate procedural safeguards are not
necessary.6 0
concern with whether treatment represents a valid and legitimate reason for a state to
confine a nondangerous individual. The Chief Justice stated:
Where claims that the State is acting in the best interests of an individual are
said to justify reduced procedural and substantive safeguards, this Court's
decisions require that they be "candidly appraised." Id., citing, In re Gault,
387 U.S. 1, 21, 27-29 (1967).
This is the identical constitutional issue from which the majority abstained.
54 - U.S. at -, 95 S. Ct. at 2499. Chief Justice Burger observed:
[Ilt would be incongruous to apply the same limitations when quarantine is
imposed by the state to protect the public from a highly communicable disease.
Id.
55 Id.
-6 - U.S. at..., 95 S. Ct. at 2500.
-1 - U.S. at - n.8, 95 S. Ct. at 2499 n.8.
5 Developments in the Law, supra note 3, at 1325 n.39. See generally, Katz, The Right
to Treatment - An Enchanting Legal Fiction?, 36 U. CHI. L. REV. 755 (1969); 2
FORDHAM URBAN L.J. 363 (1974).
s There has been much discussion of the ability of the court to provide intelligible and
enforceable standards for adequate treatment. See, e.g., Bazelon, Implementing the
Right to Treatment, 36 U. CHI. L. REV. 742 (1969); Schwitzgebel, The Right to Effec-
tive Mental Treatment, 62 CALIF. L. REV. 936 (1974); Schwitzgebel, Right to Treatment
for the Mentally Disabled: The Need for Realistic Standards and Objective Criteria, 8
HARV. Civ. RIGHTs-CIv. LIB. L. REV. 513 (1973); Developments in the Law, supra
note 3, at 1333-43; Note, Civil Restraint, Mental Illness, and the Right to Treatment,
77 YALE L.J. 87, 107-14 (1967). See generally, Symposium, Mental Disability and
the Law, 62 CALIF. L. REV. 669 (1974); Symposium, The Right to Treatment, 57 GEO.
L.J. 673 (1969); Symposium, Mentally Ill and the Law, 13 SANTA CLARA LAW. 367
(1973); Symposium, The Mentally Ill and the Right to Treatment, 36 U. CH. L. REV.
742 (1969); Note, The Nascent Right to Treatment, 53 VA. L. REV. 1134, 1148-55
(1967).
In defining the right to treatment, courts have used a number of modifications with
the term "treatment." See, e.g., Developments in the Law, supra note 3, at 1333
n.80. It has also been asserted that the right to treatment is nonjusticiable because
courts are incapable of defining treatment, defining the affirmative duty of the state,
or framing enforceable remedies. Developments in the Law, supra note 3, at 1333;
Note, Civil Restraint, Mental Illness, and the Right to Treatment, 77 YALE L.J. 87,
107-14 (1967).
60 Developments in the Law, supra note 3, at 1325 n.39. See also Szasz, Right to Health,
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Another alleged troublesome feature of the quid pro quo concept is
that the court of appeals in Donaldson did not provide a sufficient basis
for its statement that a specific act must have been committed against a
state before police power confinement without treatment can be justi-
fied.61 Chief Justice Burger strongly countered this suggestion in his
statement:
There can be little doubt that in the exercise of its police power
a State may confine individuals solely to protect society from
the dangers of significant antisocial acts or communicable dis-
ease.
62
Thus, it seems that the heart of the quid pro quo due process argument
for a constitutional right to treatment has been removed.
1. Analysis of the Concurring Opinion
In his criticism of the quid pro quo rationale, Chief Justice Burger
did not distinguish between the procedural and substantive aspects of the
theory. His first concern, that the quid pro quo theory may be under-
stood to allow a state to confine an individual under the auspices of its
willingness to provide treatment, was noted by Donaldson's counsel who
urged the Court not to hold that the provision of treatment justifies in-
voluntary confinement of a nondangerous mental patient.6 Thereafter,
counsel demonstrated to the Court the substantive nature of the quid pro
quo due process rationale.6 4 Counsel argued that the quid pro quo sub-
stantive due process rationale recognizes that due process requires that
the means by which the government abridges a person's protected liber-
57 GEo. L.J. 734 (1969). Dr. Szasz' fears of a psychiatric-defined norm being forced
upon our citizens through the vehicle of state mental institutions and the threat of
commitment are expressed in more detail in T. SzAsz, AGE OF MADNESS (1974);
T. SZAsZ, LAW, LIBERTY, AND PSYCHIATRY (1963); T. SzAsz, IDEOLOGY AND INSANITY
(1970). But see Felix. The Image of the Psychiatrist: Past, Present and Future, 121
AM. J. PSYcHIAT. 318 (Oct. 1964); Slovenko, The Psychiatric Patient: Liberty and the
Law, 121 AM. J. PSYCHIAT. 534 (Dec. 1964).
61 Developments in the Law, supra note 3, at 1325 n.39. The issue of the state's
exercise of police power in a given circumstance has been a matter of much scholarly
discussion particularly surrounding the determination of dangerousness. See generally,
LAW, LIBERTY AND PsYcHIiATRY, supra note 60; B. ENNIS, PRISONERS OF PSYCI41ATRY
(1972); Ennis & Litwack, Psychiatry and the Presumption of Expertise: Flipping Coins
in the Court Room, 62 CALIF. L. REV. 693 (1974); Developments in the Law, supra
note 3, at 1236-53; Note, The Nascent Right to Treatment, 53 VA. L. REV. 1134,
1141-43 (1967).
62 - U.S. at - 95 S. Ct. at 2497.
63 Brief for Respondent at 54. Counsel urged that the complex question need not, and
should not be decided without a full briefing based uponi a full record confronting the
following issues: is the justification for the respondent's need for treatment a com-
pelling state interest; is the "need for treatment" standard impermissibly vague;
does the nature of the civilly commited person's interest in liberty require that no
commitment can be for an indefinite period; is involuntary confinement in a state
mental hospital the least restrictive alternative for accomplishing a permissible state
purpose? Id. at 54 n.55.
61 Id. at 56-59.
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ties must bear a rational relation to the state's purpose for abridgement,6 5
and that the nature and duration of commitment must also bear some
reasonable relation to the purpose of commitment. 61 Counsel's position
in the context of the substantive aspect of the quid pro quo rationale
was that should the Court decide that a state has a constitutionally valid
interest in committing a nondangerous individual who has committed
no antisocial acts,67 the only conceivable purpose of such confinement
would be the patient's restoration to liberty through treatment. "Thus,
under Jackson, absent treatment, the nature of confinement bore no rea-
sonable relation to the purpose of . . . confinement .... ."6
The majority opinion, holding that a state has no constitutionally
valid interest in confining a nondangerous individual who is capable of
surviving in freedom for the sole purpose of providing mere custodial
care, lends support to the quid pro quo theory advanced by counsel. If
custodial care is not a valid purpose for confining a harmless individual,
and if such an individual is able to survive safely, then the only other
legitimate purpose a state could have for such confinement is the pa-
tient's restoration to liberty through treatment.6 9
Justice Burger's second stated defect in the theory advanced by coun-
sel is that it incorrectly presupposes that essentially the same interests
are involved when a state seeks to confine an individual. The Chief
Justice conspicuously observed that the purpose of confinement is not
always treatment and cited Jacobson v. Massachusetts"° as an example
of the imposition of quarantine as a proper exercise of police power.
In this example, there can be no doubt that a compelling interest exists,
71
65 Id. at 56, citing Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502 (1934) and Meyer v. Nebraska,
262 U.S. 390 (1923).
66 Id. at 56, citing Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715, 738 (1972).
67 Counsel for respondent stated that:
Even when confinement is not justified solely under the parens patriae power
but also under the police power and the individual has committed a criminal act,
this Court has suggested that involuntarily confined individuals have a right to
treatment. See McNeil v. Director, Patuxent Institution, 407 U.S. 245, 250
(1972); Humphrey v. Cady, 405 U.S. 504, 514 (1972) (indefinitely committed
sex offender's allegation that he was receiving no treatment was a "substan-
tial constitutional claim"); Murel v. Baltimore City Criminal Ct., 407 U.S. 355,
357-58 (1972) (the commitment of a "defective delinquent" should be reviewed
in terms of the "criteria, procedures and treatment provided").
Brief for Respondent at 57 n.58.
8 Id. at 57.
6 Id.
70 197 U.S. 11 (1905) (it is within the police power of the state to enact a compulsory
vaccination law). The Jacobson Court, made this analogy:
An American citizen, arriving at an American port on a vessel in which, during
the voyage, there had been cases of yellow fever or Asiatic cholera, although
apparently free from disease himself, may yet, in some circumstances, be held
in quarantine against his will on board of such vessel or in a quarantine station,
until it be ascertained by inspection . . . that the danger of the spread of the
disease among the community at large has disappeared. ld. at 29.
A question that arises is if the threat of disease has disappeared, may the citizen still be
quarantined, or if he has such disease, must he be treated?
11 Id. at 39.
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but if continued quarantine proves unnecessary in that there is no danger
to the community at large, due process would demand that the person be
released. 72  If counsel's quid pro quo incorporates the concepts of sub-
stantive due process established in Jackson v. Indiana73 and followed
in McNeil v. Director, Patuxent Institution,7 4 then, when the purpose of
confinement is not treatment (as in the quarantine analogy) the nature
of confinement must bear a reasonable relation to the purpose of con-
finement and the state must still demonstrate a legitimate state interest.75
The third major criticism, that the quid pro quo concept accepts the
absence of procedural safeguards in exchange for treatment, is a defect
of the "procedural tradeoff" quid pro quo rationale, but has little effect
on the substantive quid pro quo adopted by the appeals court and ad-
vanced by counsel. The real significance of this criticism is that it clearly
demonstrates that the quid pro quo "procedural tradeoff" theory has
been rejected by the Court. In regard to the substantive due process
quid pro quo theory, the effect of the Chief Justice's opinion remains
uncertain. It is clear, however, that the Chief Justice has rejected the
reasoning of the court of appeals and that he can find no constitutional
basis to equate a right to treatment with a mental patient's due process
rights.7
6
IV. QUID PRO Quo - PROSPECTIVELY
If the analysis of the quid pro quo theory as presented by Chief Jus-
tice Burger in his concurring opinion is in fact shared by thd majority of
the Court, then the distinction between the procedural-substantive aspects
of this rationale will, in reality, be purely academic. Its vitality will have
ceased, and from this point on, it will exist only in an environment of
academic legal distinctions.
72 Id. at 38. The Court stated:
[T]hat the police power of a State . . . may be exerted in such circumstances
or by regulations so arbitrary and oppressive in particular cases as to justify the
interference of the courts to prevent wrong and oppression. Id.
73 406 U.S. 715 (1972).
74 407 U.S. 245 (1972).
7, See text accompanying notes 36-49 supra. This quid pro quo theory purportedly
follows the line of Supreme Court decisions holding that commitment must be justified
on the basis of a legitimate state interest. The reasons for commitment must be
established at an appropriate proceeding and any confinement must cease when those
reasons no longer exist. See McNeil v. Director, Patuxent Institution, 407 U.S. 245,
249-50 (1970); Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715, 738 (1972); Humphrey v. Cady,
405 U.S. 504 (1972).
76 - U.S. at - 95 S. Ct. at 2500. Although the quid pro quo theory has been rejected,
there are other grounds which have been advanced to support a constitutional right to
treatment. In the alternative, counsel contended that a right to treatment exists under
the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment and under the cruel and
unusual punishment prohibition of the eighth amendment. Brief for Respondent at 52.
See also Friedman & Halpern, The Right to Treatment, 1 LEGAL RIGHrs OF THE MENTALLY
HANDICAPPED 273, 281-82 (B. Ennis & P. Friedman eds. 1974). See generally, Note,
The Right to Treatment - Alternative Rationales, 10 DUQUESNE L. REV. 626 (1972)
(analogy of right to counsel and right to education to the right to treatment).
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Attorneys specializing in psychiatric matters, however, have viewed
as highly significant the fact that only the Chief Justice stated that a
right to treatment does not exist.77 The majority of the Court left the
question of a right to treatment, and the respective quid pro quo argu-
ment, unresolved. Justice Stewart has suggested that Kenneth Donald-
son's confinement might have been valid if he had received treatment
rather than mere custodial care. If it is determined that a state may
constitutionally confine an involuntary, nondangerous, mentally ill per-
son for treatment, then the substantive due process quid pro quo argu-
ment, in light of the Court's ruling in Jackson, is still valid. It will retain
its vitality as a constitutional argument, asserted to ensure that the state
provide treatment to such persons under its parens patriae powers.
The real impact of the Supreme Court's decision in O'Connor v.
Donaldson cannot yet be fully ascertained, but it will most certainly
have a great effect on the present methods and standards of civil commit-
ment. Some possible effects include an updating of current state commit-
ment statutes; greater focus on the problems in defining and predicting
dangerousness, including a clearer determination of the type and degree
of proof necessary; a clarification by the legal and medical professions
of the definition of "treatment" and the establishment of more suitable
and judicially enforceable standards of treatment; an unequivocal expla-
nation by the courts or the legislatures as to what classifies a person as
being capable of "surviving safely in freedom"; stricter scrutiny by the
courts regarding voluntary commitment procedures; a determination of
the grounds and procedures by which a state may convert a voluntary
patient to an involuntary patient; and a clarification regarding what rights
a voluntary patient has in terms of treatment or the refusal of treatment
and release.
The probable result of the Court's holding is the outright release of
thousands of mental patients from psychiatric hospitals,7 8 but to date no
such wholesale release has occurred.7 9 More than likely, additional re-
leases in the near future will depend on whether the petitioning patients
and their attorneys can show that the Donaldson decision applies to
them.s0  Although the present decision may be less than a landmark,8
it has great significance in confronting and defining the constitutional
rights of the mentally ill.
THOMAS P. BLISS
7 N.Y. Times, Aug. 17, 1975, at 34, col. 1.
s N.Y. Times, June 27, 1975, at 1, col. 5. But see N.Y. Times, Aug. 17, 1975, at 1, col. 5.
r N.Y. Times, Aug. 17, 1975, at 1, col. 5. Another possible result is the state's release of
patients allegedly because of the O'Connor decision but in reality because of economic
considerations, raising the issue of whether the state has an affirmative duty to provide
a facility for treatment of the mentally ill.
s Id. at 24, col. 1.
s' A criticism of the decision is that the Court's ruling is imprecise and unclear, thus
permitting most mental health agencies to say that it does not apply to their patients.
Id.
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